A conceptualist reply to Hanna's Kantian non-conceptualism

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Abstract

Hanna proposes a version of non-conceptualism he closely associates with Kant. This paper takes issue with his proposal on two fronts. First, there are reasons to dispute whether any version of non-conceptualism can be rightly attributed to Kant. In addition to pointing out passages that conflict with Hanna's interpretation, I also suggest ways in which the Kant of the opus postumum could integrate key insights of non-conceptualism into a basically conceptualist framework. In Part Two of the paper, I turn to a more systematically oriented critique of Hanna's nonconceptualism. Drawing on work by Gareth Evans, John McDowell, Sonia Sedivy, and Alva No, I argue that conceptualism is in a position to integrate the points which are taken by Hanna to speak most strongly in favor of non-conceptualism. In particular, I argue for the deep compatibility of conceptualism and direct realism. At the same time, I point to what I see as weaknesses in Hanna's defence of non-conceptualism.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)417-446
Number of pages30
JournalInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies
Volume19
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 1 2011

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Conceptualist
Immanuel Kant
Conceptualism
Direct Realism
Gareth Evans
Opus
Dispute
John McDowell
Compatibility

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Philosophy

Cite this

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A conceptualist reply to Hanna's Kantian non-conceptualism. / Bowman, Brady.

In: International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Vol. 19, No. 3, 01.07.2011, p. 417-446.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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