A framework for modeling decision making and deception with semantic information

Christopher Griffin, Kathleen Moore

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

We propose a mixed logical and game theoretic framework for modeling decision making under the potential for deception. This framework is most appropriate for online communities in which a decision maker must act upon information being provided by various sources with various different motivations. We show that in the simple three-player game we propose there are always equilibria in pure strategies. We then extend the three player game to a case where there are mixed strategy equilibria. We discuss how to approximate the truth of a given statement using a logical construct and how this can be used as a proxy in payoff functions. Finally we discuss as future directions the use of regret functions and live play.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings - IEEE CS Security and Privacy Workshops, SPW 2012
Pages68-74
Number of pages7
DOIs
StatePublished - 2012
Event1st IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops, SPW 2012 - San Francisco, CA, United States
Duration: May 24 2012May 25 2012

Publication series

NameProceedings - IEEE CS Security and Privacy Workshops, SPW 2012

Other

Other1st IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops, SPW 2012
CountryUnited States
CitySan Francisco, CA
Period5/24/125/25/12

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Networks and Communications

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