A game-theoretical model of a decentralized supply chain under price sensitive demand

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Coordination among stages within a supply chain represents a crucial problem, particularly in the cases where control is decentralized. In this paper we consider the coordination among partners in a two-stage decentralized supply chain, where the first stage is a supplier and the second stage a buyer. We analyze the development of coordination mechanisms through the use of quantity discounts and inventory coordination, with the aim of optimizing the performance of the chain assuming that the stages trade a single product that experiences a pricesensitive demand. By considering a game theoretical framework, we develop a non-cooperative and cooperative models. In the former case we take the supplier as the leader in the negotiation and build his optimal discount policy using a Stackelberg equilibrium. For the latter case we optimize the complete supply chain's performance by taking all players' decisions simultaneously in an integrated optimization model. We analyze the benefits of cooperation among players through numerical examples.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication67th Annual Conference and Expo of the Institute of Industrial Engineers 2017
PublisherInstitute of Industrial Engineers
Pages265-270
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)9780983762461
StatePublished - 2017
Event67th Annual Conference and Expo of the Institute of Industrial Engineers 2017 - Pittsburgh, United States
Duration: May 20 2017May 23 2017

Other

Other67th Annual Conference and Expo of the Institute of Industrial Engineers 2017
CountryUnited States
CityPittsburgh
Period5/20/175/23/17

Fingerprint

Supply chains
Decentralized control

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering

Cite this

Venegas Quintrileo, B., & Ventura, J. A. (2017). A game-theoretical model of a decentralized supply chain under price sensitive demand. In 67th Annual Conference and Expo of the Institute of Industrial Engineers 2017 (pp. 265-270). Institute of Industrial Engineers.
Venegas Quintrileo, Barbara ; Ventura, Jose Antonio. / A game-theoretical model of a decentralized supply chain under price sensitive demand. 67th Annual Conference and Expo of the Institute of Industrial Engineers 2017. Institute of Industrial Engineers, 2017. pp. 265-270
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Venegas Quintrileo, B & Ventura, JA 2017, A game-theoretical model of a decentralized supply chain under price sensitive demand. in 67th Annual Conference and Expo of the Institute of Industrial Engineers 2017. Institute of Industrial Engineers, pp. 265-270, 67th Annual Conference and Expo of the Institute of Industrial Engineers 2017, Pittsburgh, United States, 5/20/17.

A game-theoretical model of a decentralized supply chain under price sensitive demand. / Venegas Quintrileo, Barbara; Ventura, Jose Antonio.

67th Annual Conference and Expo of the Institute of Industrial Engineers 2017. Institute of Industrial Engineers, 2017. p. 265-270.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

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Venegas Quintrileo B, Ventura JA. A game-theoretical model of a decentralized supply chain under price sensitive demand. In 67th Annual Conference and Expo of the Institute of Industrial Engineers 2017. Institute of Industrial Engineers. 2017. p. 265-270