A general approach for population games with application to vaccination

Timothy Reluga, Alison P. Galvani

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

65 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Reconciling the interests of individuals with the interests of communities is a major challenge in designing and implementing health policies. In this paper, we present a technique based on a combination of mechanistic population-scale models, Markov decision process theory and game theory that facilitates the evaluation of game theoretic decisions at both individual and community scales. To illustrate our technique, we provide solutions to several variants of the simple vaccination game including imperfect vaccine efficacy and differential waning of natural and vaccine immunity. In addition, we show how path-integral approaches can be applied to the study of models in which strategies are fixed waiting times rather than exponential random variables. These methods can be applied to a wide variety of decision problems with population-dynamic feedbacks.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)67-78
Number of pages12
JournalMathematical Biosciences
Volume230
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 1 2011

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Vaccines
Vaccination
vaccination
Vaccine Efficacy
Decision Theory
Game Theory
Game
Markov Chains
Population dynamics
Vaccine
Game theory
Markov Decision Process
Population Dynamics
Immunity
Health Policy
Curvilinear integral
Waiting Time
Random variables
Innate Immunity
Decision problem

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Modeling and Simulation
  • Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology(all)
  • Immunology and Microbiology(all)
  • Agricultural and Biological Sciences(all)
  • Applied Mathematics

Cite this

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A general approach for population games with application to vaccination. / Reluga, Timothy; Galvani, Alison P.

In: Mathematical Biosciences, Vol. 230, No. 2, 01.04.2011, p. 67-78.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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