A model of expertise

Vijay Krishna, John Morgan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

237 Scopus citations


We study a model in which perfectly informed experts offer advice to a decision maker whose actions affect the welfare of all. Experts are biased and thus may wish to pull the decision maker in different directions and to different degrees When the decision maker consults only a single expert, the expert withholds substantial information from the decision maker. We ask whether this situation is improved by having the decision maker sequentially consult two experts. We first show that there is no perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which full revelation occurs. When both experts are biased in the same direction, it is never beneficial to consult both. In contrast, when experts are biased in opposite directions it is always beneficial to consult both. Indeed, in this case full revelation may be induced in an extended debate by introducing the possibility of rebuttal.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)747-775
Number of pages29
JournalQuarterly Journal of Economics
Issue number2
StatePublished - May 2001

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics


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