A new and improved design for multiobject iterative auctions

Anthony Mark Kwasnica, John O. Ledyard, Dave Porter, Christine DeMartini

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

126 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper we present a new improved design for multiobject auctions and report on the results of experimental tests of that design. We merge the better features of two extant but very different auction processes, the Simultaneous Multiple Round (SMR) design used by the FCC to auction the electromagnetic spectrum and the Adaptive User Selection Mechanism (AUSM) of Banks et al. (1989, "Allocating uncertain and unresponsive resources: An experimental approach," RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 1-25). Then, by adding one crucial new feature, we are able to create a new design, the Resource Allocation Design (RAD) auction process, which performs better than both. Our experiments demonstrate that the RAD auction achieves higher efficiencies, lower bidder losses, higher net revenues, and faster times to completion without increasing the complexity of a bidder's problem.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)419-434
Number of pages16
JournalManagement Science
Volume51
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 1 2005

Fingerprint

Multi-object auctions
Auction design
Auctions
Resource allocation
Resources
Experimental tests
Revenue
Experiment
Economics

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Strategy and Management
  • Management Science and Operations Research

Cite this

Kwasnica, Anthony Mark ; Ledyard, John O. ; Porter, Dave ; DeMartini, Christine. / A new and improved design for multiobject iterative auctions. In: Management Science. 2005 ; Vol. 51, No. 3. pp. 419-434.
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A new and improved design for multiobject iterative auctions. / Kwasnica, Anthony Mark; Ledyard, John O.; Porter, Dave; DeMartini, Christine.

In: Management Science, Vol. 51, No. 3, 01.03.2005, p. 419-434.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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