Abstract
In this paper we present a new improved design for multiobject auctions and report on the results of experimental tests of that design. We merge the better features of two extant but very different auction processes, the Simultaneous Multiple Round (SMR) design used by the FCC to auction the electromagnetic spectrum and the Adaptive User Selection Mechanism (AUSM) of Banks et al. (1989, "Allocating uncertain and unresponsive resources: An experimental approach," RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 1-25). Then, by adding one crucial new feature, we are able to create a new design, the Resource Allocation Design (RAD) auction process, which performs better than both. Our experiments demonstrate that the RAD auction achieves higher efficiencies, lower bidder losses, higher net revenues, and faster times to completion without increasing the complexity of a bidder's problem.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 419-434 |
| Number of pages | 16 |
| Journal | Management Science |
| Volume | 51 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Mar 1 2005 |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Strategy and Management
- Management Science and Operations Research
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A new and improved design for multiobject iterative auctions. / Kwasnica, Anthony M.; Ledyard, John O.; Porter, Dave; DeMartini, Christine.
In: Management Science, Vol. 51, No. 3, 01.03.2005, p. 419-434.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
TY - JOUR
T1 - A new and improved design for multiobject iterative auctions
AU - Kwasnica, Anthony M.
AU - Ledyard, John O.
AU - Porter, Dave
AU - DeMartini, Christine
PY - 2005/3/1
Y1 - 2005/3/1
N2 - In this paper we present a new improved design for multiobject auctions and report on the results of experimental tests of that design. We merge the better features of two extant but very different auction processes, the Simultaneous Multiple Round (SMR) design used by the FCC to auction the electromagnetic spectrum and the Adaptive User Selection Mechanism (AUSM) of Banks et al. (1989, "Allocating uncertain and unresponsive resources: An experimental approach," RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 1-25). Then, by adding one crucial new feature, we are able to create a new design, the Resource Allocation Design (RAD) auction process, which performs better than both. Our experiments demonstrate that the RAD auction achieves higher efficiencies, lower bidder losses, higher net revenues, and faster times to completion without increasing the complexity of a bidder's problem.
AB - In this paper we present a new improved design for multiobject auctions and report on the results of experimental tests of that design. We merge the better features of two extant but very different auction processes, the Simultaneous Multiple Round (SMR) design used by the FCC to auction the electromagnetic spectrum and the Adaptive User Selection Mechanism (AUSM) of Banks et al. (1989, "Allocating uncertain and unresponsive resources: An experimental approach," RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 1-25). Then, by adding one crucial new feature, we are able to create a new design, the Resource Allocation Design (RAD) auction process, which performs better than both. Our experiments demonstrate that the RAD auction achieves higher efficiencies, lower bidder losses, higher net revenues, and faster times to completion without increasing the complexity of a bidder's problem.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=18144374570&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=18144374570&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1287/mnsc.1040.0334
DO - 10.1287/mnsc.1040.0334
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:18144374570
VL - 51
SP - 419
EP - 434
JO - Management Science
JF - Management Science
SN - 0025-1909
IS - 3
ER -