A note on overemployment/underemployment in labor contracts under asymmetric information

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

19 Scopus citations

Abstract

Models of labor contracts under asymmetric information may predict either overemployment or underemployment. This paper shows that this result depends crucially on whether or not leisure is a normal good if firms are risk neutral.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)81-87
Number of pages7
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume12
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 1983

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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