A note on overemployment/underemployment in labor contracts under asymmetric information

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

18 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Models of labor contracts under asymmetric information may predict either overemployment or underemployment. This paper shows that this result depends crucially on whether or not leisure is a normal good if firms are risk neutral.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)81-87
Number of pages7
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume12
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 1983

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Underemployment
Leisure
Asymmetric information
Labor contracts

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

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abstract = "Models of labor contracts under asymmetric information may predict either overemployment or underemployment. This paper shows that this result depends crucially on whether or not leisure is a normal good if firms are risk neutral.",
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A note on overemployment/underemployment in labor contracts under asymmetric information. / Cooper, Russell Wade.

In: Economics Letters, Vol. 12, No. 1, 01.01.1983, p. 81-87.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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