A shared-constraint approach to multi-leader multi-follower games

Ankur A. Kulkarni, Vinayak V. Shanbhag

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

27 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Multi-leader multi-follower games are a class of hierarchical games in which a collection of leaders compete in a Nash game constrained by the equilibrium conditions of another Nash game amongst the followers. The resulting equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints is complicated by nonconvex agent problems and therefore providing tractable conditions for existence of global or even local equilibria has proved challenging. Consequently, much of the extant research on this topic is either model specific or relies on weaker notions of equilibria. We consider a modified formulation in which every leader is cognizant of the equilibrium constraints of all leaders. Equilibria of this modified game contain the equilibria, if any, of the original game. The new formulation has a constraint structure called shared constraints, and our main result shows that if the leader objectives admit a potential function, the global minimizers of the potential function over this shared constraint are equilibria of the modified formulation. We provide another existence result using fixed point theory that does not require potentiality. Additionally, local minima, B-stationary, and strong-stationary points of this minimization problem are shown to be local Nash equilibria, Nash B-stationary, and Nash strong-stationary points of the corresponding multi-leader multi-follower game. We demonstrate the relationship between variational equilibria associated with this modified shared-constraint game and equilibria of the original game from the standpoint of the multiplier sets and show how equilibria of the original formulation may be recovered. We note through several examples that such potential multi-leader multi-follower games capture a breadth of application problems of interest and demonstrate our findings on a multi-leader multi-follower Cournot game.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)691-720
Number of pages30
JournalSet-Valued and Variational Analysis
Volume22
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2014

Fingerprint

Game
Equilibrium Constraints
Local Equilibrium
Formulation
Stationary point
Potential Function
Global Minimizer
Breadth
Fixed Point Theory
Equilibrium Problem
Local Minima
Nash Equilibrium
Minimization Problem
Demonstrate
Existence Results
Multiplier

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Analysis
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Numerical Analysis
  • Geometry and Topology
  • Applied Mathematics

Cite this

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A shared-constraint approach to multi-leader multi-follower games. / Kulkarni, Ankur A.; Shanbhag, Vinayak V.

In: Set-Valued and Variational Analysis, Vol. 22, No. 4, 01.01.2014, p. 691-720.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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