Abnormal Accruals and Managerial Intent: Evidence from the Timing of Merger Announcements and Completions

Henock Louis, Amy X. Sun

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We examine acquiring managers' opportunistic reporting behavior around stock-for-stock acquisitions. Using the timing of merger announcements and completions to infer managerial intent, we show that acquirers with the most inflated earnings tend to announce mergers on Fridays, and that they manage earnings several quarters before the merger announcement date. Friday announcers exhibit a stronger negative association between pre-merger announcement abnormal accruals and post-merger announcement market performance than non-Friday announcers. This effect is driven mainly by mergers that are completed relatively quickly after they are announced. Overall, the evidence supports the notion that some acquiring managers inflate earnings prior to announcing the mergers, and time the merger announcements to exploit investor inattention.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1101-1135
Number of pages35
JournalContemporary Accounting Research
Volume33
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2016

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Mergers
Abnormal accruals
Announcement
Managers
Investors
Market performance

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

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Abnormal Accruals and Managerial Intent : Evidence from the Timing of Merger Announcements and Completions. / Louis, Henock; Sun, Amy X.

In: Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 33, No. 3, 01.01.2016, p. 1101-1135.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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