All-pay contests

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

126 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper studies a class of games, "all-pay contests," which capture general asymmetries and sunk investments inherent in scenarios such as lobbying, competition for market power, labor-market tournaments, and R&D races. Players compete for one of several identical prizes by choosing a score. Conditional on winning or losing, it is weakly better to do so with a lower score. This formulation allows for differing production technologies, costs of capital, prior investments, attitudes toward risk, and conditional and unconditional investments, among others. I provide a closed-form formula for players' equilibrium payoffs and analyze player participation. A special case of contests is multiprize, complete-information all-pay auctions.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)71-92
Number of pages22
JournalEconometrica
Volume77
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 2009

Fingerprint

Contests
Tournament
Labour market
Scenarios
Complete information
Production technology
All-pay auction
Lobbying
Market power
Asymmetry
Participation
Cost of capital

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Siegel, Ron. / All-pay contests. In: Econometrica. 2009 ; Vol. 77, No. 1. pp. 71-92.
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All-pay contests. / Siegel, Ron.

In: Econometrica, Vol. 77, No. 1, 01.2009, p. 71-92.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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