Ambient taxes under m-dimensional choice sets, heterogeneous expectations, and risk-aversion

Richard D. Horan, James S. Shortle, David G. Abler

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

13 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider the design of ambient taxes for risk-neutral and risk-averse polluters when polluters and the regulatory agency have asymmetric information about environmental relationships and probabilities associated with random events. Unlike prior work, we show that under these conditions, optimal ambient taxes must be firm-specific, and accompanied by additional incentives to influence polluters' choices of abatement techniques.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)189-202
Number of pages14
JournalEnvironmental and Resource Economics
Volume21
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 17 2002

Fingerprint

Taxation
asymmetric information
incentive
tax
Heterogeneous expectations
Ambient taxes
Risk aversion
Choice sets
firm
Asymmetric information
Abatement
Risk-averse
Incentives

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law

Cite this

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Ambient taxes under m-dimensional choice sets, heterogeneous expectations, and risk-aversion. / Horan, Richard D.; Shortle, James S.; Abler, David G.

In: Environmental and Resource Economics, Vol. 21, No. 2, 17.04.2002, p. 189-202.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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