Ambient taxes when polluters have multiple choices

Richard D. Horan; James Samuel Shortle; David Gerard Abler

doi:10.1006/jeem.1998.1041

Ambient taxes when polluters have multiple choices

Richard D. Horan, James Samuel Shortle, David Gerard Abler

Agricultural Economics, Sociology and Education

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

78 Scopus citations

Abstract

Ambient-based tax-subsidy schemes have drawn considerable interest in nonpoint pollution literature as alternatives to emissions-based instruments. Expanding especially on Segerson's [J. Environ. Econom. Management 15, 88-98 (1988)] seminal article, this article examines the optimal design and budget-balancing properties of ambient tax-subsidy schemes under more realistic assumptions about the dimensions of firms' choice sets than prior research.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	186-199
Number of pages	14
Journal	Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
Volume	36
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1006/jeem.1998.1041
State	Published - Jan 1 1998

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Economics and Econometrics
Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law

Access to Document

10.1006/jeem.1998.1041

Cite this

@article{349e1ad70e7342ccb015156879c9899a,

title = "Ambient taxes when polluters have multiple choices",

abstract = "Ambient-based tax-subsidy schemes have drawn considerable interest in nonpoint pollution literature as alternatives to emissions-based instruments. Expanding especially on Segerson's [J. Environ. Econom. Management 15, 88-98 (1988)] seminal article, this article examines the optimal design and budget-balancing properties of ambient tax-subsidy schemes under more realistic assumptions about the dimensions of firms' choice sets than prior research.",

author = "Horan, {Richard D.} and Shortle, {James Samuel} and Abler, {David Gerard}",

year = "1998",

month = jan,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1006/jeem.1998.1041",

language = "English (US)",

volume = "36",

pages = "186--199",

journal = "Journal of Environmental Economics and Management",

issn = "0095-0696",

publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",

number = "2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Ambient taxes when polluters have multiple choices

AU - Horan, Richard D.

AU - Shortle, James Samuel

AU - Abler, David Gerard

PY - 1998/1/1

Y1 - 1998/1/1

N2 - Ambient-based tax-subsidy schemes have drawn considerable interest in nonpoint pollution literature as alternatives to emissions-based instruments. Expanding especially on Segerson's [J. Environ. Econom. Management 15, 88-98 (1988)] seminal article, this article examines the optimal design and budget-balancing properties of ambient tax-subsidy schemes under more realistic assumptions about the dimensions of firms' choice sets than prior research.

AB - Ambient-based tax-subsidy schemes have drawn considerable interest in nonpoint pollution literature as alternatives to emissions-based instruments. Expanding especially on Segerson's [J. Environ. Econom. Management 15, 88-98 (1988)] seminal article, this article examines the optimal design and budget-balancing properties of ambient tax-subsidy schemes under more realistic assumptions about the dimensions of firms' choice sets than prior research.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0031692133&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0031692133&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1006/jeem.1998.1041

DO - 10.1006/jeem.1998.1041

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:0031692133

VL - 36

SP - 186

EP - 199

JO - Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

JF - Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

SN - 0095-0696

IS - 2

ER -

Ambient taxes when polluters have multiple choices

Abstract

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this