An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction

Vijay Krishna, John Morgan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

145 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study the war of attrition and the all-pay auction when players' signals are affiliated and symmetrically distributed. We (a) find sufficient conditions for the existence of symmetric monotonic equilibrium bidding strategies and (b) examine the performance of these auction forms in terms of the expected revenue accruing to the seller. Under our conditions the war of attrition raises greater expected revenue than all other known sealed-bid auction forms.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D44, D82.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)343-362
Number of pages20
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume72
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 1 1997

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War of attrition
All-pay auction
Revenue
Economics
Sealed-bid auction
Bidding strategy
Seller
Auctions

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

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An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction. / Krishna, Vijay; Morgan, John.

In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 72, No. 2, 01.02.1997, p. 343-362.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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