An evolutionary game model for the spread of non-cooperative behavior in online social networks

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

We present an evolutionary game-theoretic model for the spread of non-cooperative behavior in online social networks. We formulate a two-strategy game wherein each player's behavior is classified as normal (cooperate) or abusive (defect) and pairwise interactions between adjacent players in the network graph yield a unique payoff to each according a prisoner's dilemma payoff structure. Player strategies evolve by imitation of successful behavior in observable neighborhoods. We demonstrate convergence of player behavior over time to a final strategy vector. Proof-of-concept is given for a real-world dataset collected from a popular online forum.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2015 Symposium on Applied Computing, SAC 2015
EditorsDongwan Shin
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery
Pages1154-1159
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)9781450331968
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 13 2015
Event30th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing, SAC 2015 - Salamanca, Spain
Duration: Apr 13 2015Apr 17 2015

Publication series

NameProceedings of the ACM Symposium on Applied Computing
Volume13-17-April-2015

Other

Other30th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing, SAC 2015
Country/TerritorySpain
CitySalamanca
Period4/13/154/17/15

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Software

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