An incentive-aligned mechanism for conjoint analysis

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109 Scopus citations

Abstract

This article specifies, analyzes, and validates a rigorous and practical truth-telling mechanism (game) for conjoint applications. The mechanism requires only one real product variation and has truth telling in conjoint as its Bayesian Nash equilibrium, thus making it possible to incentive align participants in most conjoint applications. Using the iPod package as the context, the author shows empirically that the mechanism substantially improves purchase prediction compared with a standard conjoint procedure.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)214-223
Number of pages10
JournalJournal of Marketing Research
Volume44
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - May 2007

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Business and International Management
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Marketing

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