Analyst pessimism and forecast timing

Orie E. Barron, Donal Byard, Lihong Liang

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this study, we show that on average relatively pessimistic analysts tend to reveal their earnings forecasts later than other analysts. Further, we find this forecast timing effect explains a substantial proportion of the well-known decrease in consensus analyst forecast optimism over the forecast period prior to earnings announcements, which helps explain why analysts' longer term earnings forecasts are more optimistically biased than their shorter term forecasts. We extend the theory of analyst self-selection regarding their coverage decisions to argue that analysts with a relatively pessimistic view-compared to other analysts-are more reluctant to issue their earnings forecasts, with the result that they tend to defer revealing their earnings forecasts until later in the forecasting period than other analysts.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)719-739
Number of pages21
JournalJournal of Business Finance and Accounting
Volume40
Issue number5-6
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 1 2013

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Pessimism
Analysts
Earnings forecasts
Optimism
Self-selection
Proportion
Earnings announcements
Analysts' forecasts

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Accounting
  • Business, Management and Accounting (miscellaneous)
  • Finance

Cite this

Barron, Orie E. ; Byard, Donal ; Liang, Lihong. / Analyst pessimism and forecast timing. In: Journal of Business Finance and Accounting. 2013 ; Vol. 40, No. 5-6. pp. 719-739.
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Analyst pessimism and forecast timing. / Barron, Orie E.; Byard, Donal; Liang, Lihong.

In: Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol. 40, No. 5-6, 01.06.2013, p. 719-739.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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