TY - JOUR
T1 - Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
AU - Siegel, Ron
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2014 Elsevier Inc.
PY - 2014/9/1
Y1 - 2014/9/1
N2 - I show that a unique equilibrium exists in an asymmetric two-player all-pay auction with a discrete signal structure, correlated signals, and interdependent valuations. The proof is constructive, and the construction can be implemented as a computer program and be used to derive comparative statics. I also characterize the set of equilibria when a reserve price is introduced.
AB - I show that a unique equilibrium exists in an asymmetric two-player all-pay auction with a discrete signal structure, correlated signals, and interdependent valuations. The proof is constructive, and the construction can be implemented as a computer program and be used to derive comparative statics. I also characterize the set of equilibria when a reserve price is introduced.
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U2 - 10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.003
DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.003
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84897967777
SN - 0022-0531
VL - 153
SP - 684
EP - 702
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
ER -