Asymmetric contests with conditional investments

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

40 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper studies equilibrium behavior in a class of games that models asymmetric competitions with unconditional and conditional investments. Such competitions include lobbying settings, labor-market tournaments, and R&D races, among others. I provide an algorithm that constructs the unique equilibrium in these games and apply it to study competitions in which a fraction of each competitor's investment is sunk and the rest is paid only by the winners. Complete-information all-pay auctions are a special case.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)2230-2260
Number of pages31
JournalAmerican Economic Review
Volume100
Issue number5
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2010

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Contests
Competitors
Labour market
Complete information
Tournament
Lobbying
Asymmetric competition
All-pay auction

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

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Asymmetric contests with conditional investments. / Siegel, Ron.

In: American Economic Review, Vol. 100, No. 5, 01.12.2010, p. 2230-2260.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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