Asymmetric information and the automobile loan market

Sumit Agarwal, Brent W. Ambrose, Souphala Chomsisengphet

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

Information revelation can occur through a variety of mechanisms. For example, corporate finance research has established that a firm’s dividend policies provide investors with information about future growth prospects.1 In addition, research on residential mortgages indicates that borrowers reveal their expected tenure through their choice of mortgage contracts.2 As a result, lenders offer a menu of mortgage interest rate and point combinations in an effort to learn about borrower potential mobility.3 Similarly, lenders may anticipate how consumer debt will perform by observing the consumption choices that are being financed. With the proliferation of risk-based pricing in credit markets, lender’s ability to further differentiate between borrower credit risks, based on consumer choice of goods, offers lenders a potentially important source to enhance profitability, as well as the potential to extend credit to a wider range of borrowers.4.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationHousehold Credit Usage
Subtitle of host publicationPersonal Debt and Mortgages
PublisherPalgrave Macmillan
Pages93-116
Number of pages24
ISBN (Electronic)9780230608917
ISBN (Print)9781403983923
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2007

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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)

Cite this

Agarwal, S., Ambrose, B. W., & Chomsisengphet, S. (2007). Asymmetric information and the automobile loan market. In Household Credit Usage: Personal Debt and Mortgages (pp. 93-116). Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230608917_6