Attack-resilient time synchronization for wireless sensor networks

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

49 Scopus citations

Abstract

The existing time synchronization schemes in sensor networks were not designed with security in mind, thus leaving them vulnerable to security attacks. In this paper, we first identify various attacks that are effective to several representative time synchronization schemes, and then focus on a specific type of attack called delay attack, which cannot be addressed by cryptographic techniques. Next we propose two approaches to detect and accommodate the delay attack. Our first approach uses the generalized extreme studentized deviate (GESD) algorithm to detect multiple outliers introduced by the compromised nodes; our second approach uses a threshold derived using a time transformation technique to filter out the outliers. Finally we show the effectiveness of these two schemes through extensive simulations.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2nd IEEE International Conference on Mobile Ad-hoc and Sensor Systems, MASS 2005
Pages765-772
Number of pages8
DOIs
StatePublished - 2005
Event2nd IEEE International Conference on Mobile Ad-hoc and Sensor Systems, MASS 2005 - Washington, United States
Duration: Nov 7 2005Nov 10 2005

Publication series

Name2nd IEEE International Conference on Mobile Ad-hoc and Sensor Systems, MASS 2005
Volume2005

Other

Other2nd IEEE International Conference on Mobile Ad-hoc and Sensor Systems, MASS 2005
CountryUnited States
CityWashington
Period11/7/0511/10/05

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Engineering(all)

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