### Abstract

Authentication is a well-studied area of classical cryptography: a sender A and a receiver B sharing a classical secret key want to exchange a classical message with the guarantee that the message has not been modified or replaced by a dishonest party with control of the communication line. In this paper we study the authentication of messages composed of quantum states. We give a formal definition of authentication in the quantum setting. Assuming A and B have access to an insecure quantum channel and share a secret, classical random key, we provide a non-interactive scheme that enables A to both encrypt and authenticate an m qubit message by encoding it into m + s qubits, where the error probability decreases exponentially in the security parameter s. The scheme requires a secret key of size 2m + O(s). To achieve this, we give a highly efficient protocol for testing the purity of shared EPR pairs. It has long been known that learning information about a general quantum state will necessarily disturb it. We refine this result to show that such a disturbance can be done with few side effects, allowing it to circumvent cryptographic protections. Consequently, any scheme to authenticate quantum messages must also encrypt them. In contrast, no such constraint exists classically. This reasoning has two important consequences: It allows us to give a lower bound of 2m key bits for authenticating m qubits, which makes our protocol asymptotically optimal. Moreover, we use it to show that digitally signing quantum states is impossible.

Original language | English (US) |
---|---|

Pages (from-to) | 449-458 |

Number of pages | 10 |

Journal | Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science - Proceedings |

State | Published - Dec 1 2002 |

Event | The 34rd Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science - Vancouver, BC, Canada Duration: Nov 16 2002 → Nov 19 2002 |

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### All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

- Hardware and Architecture

### Cite this

*Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science - Proceedings*, 449-458.

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*Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science - Proceedings*, pp. 449-458.

**Authentication of quantum messages.** / Barnum, Howard; Crépeau, Claude; Gottesman, Daniel; Smith, Adam Davison; Tapp, Alain.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Conference article

TY - JOUR

T1 - Authentication of quantum messages

AU - Barnum, Howard

AU - Crépeau, Claude

AU - Gottesman, Daniel

AU - Smith, Adam Davison

AU - Tapp, Alain

PY - 2002/12/1

Y1 - 2002/12/1

N2 - Authentication is a well-studied area of classical cryptography: a sender A and a receiver B sharing a classical secret key want to exchange a classical message with the guarantee that the message has not been modified or replaced by a dishonest party with control of the communication line. In this paper we study the authentication of messages composed of quantum states. We give a formal definition of authentication in the quantum setting. Assuming A and B have access to an insecure quantum channel and share a secret, classical random key, we provide a non-interactive scheme that enables A to both encrypt and authenticate an m qubit message by encoding it into m + s qubits, where the error probability decreases exponentially in the security parameter s. The scheme requires a secret key of size 2m + O(s). To achieve this, we give a highly efficient protocol for testing the purity of shared EPR pairs. It has long been known that learning information about a general quantum state will necessarily disturb it. We refine this result to show that such a disturbance can be done with few side effects, allowing it to circumvent cryptographic protections. Consequently, any scheme to authenticate quantum messages must also encrypt them. In contrast, no such constraint exists classically. This reasoning has two important consequences: It allows us to give a lower bound of 2m key bits for authenticating m qubits, which makes our protocol asymptotically optimal. Moreover, we use it to show that digitally signing quantum states is impossible.

AB - Authentication is a well-studied area of classical cryptography: a sender A and a receiver B sharing a classical secret key want to exchange a classical message with the guarantee that the message has not been modified or replaced by a dishonest party with control of the communication line. In this paper we study the authentication of messages composed of quantum states. We give a formal definition of authentication in the quantum setting. Assuming A and B have access to an insecure quantum channel and share a secret, classical random key, we provide a non-interactive scheme that enables A to both encrypt and authenticate an m qubit message by encoding it into m + s qubits, where the error probability decreases exponentially in the security parameter s. The scheme requires a secret key of size 2m + O(s). To achieve this, we give a highly efficient protocol for testing the purity of shared EPR pairs. It has long been known that learning information about a general quantum state will necessarily disturb it. We refine this result to show that such a disturbance can be done with few side effects, allowing it to circumvent cryptographic protections. Consequently, any scheme to authenticate quantum messages must also encrypt them. In contrast, no such constraint exists classically. This reasoning has two important consequences: It allows us to give a lower bound of 2m key bits for authenticating m qubits, which makes our protocol asymptotically optimal. Moreover, we use it to show that digitally signing quantum states is impossible.

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M3 - Conference article

AN - SCOPUS:0036954511

SP - 449

EP - 458

JO - Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science - Proceedings

JF - Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science - Proceedings

SN - 0272-5428

ER -