Autocratic Legislatures and Expropriation Risk

Matthew Charles Wilson, Joseph Wright

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

12 Scopus citations

Abstract

An important question for international investors concerns the relationship between political institutions and property rights. Yet a debate remains over whether authoritarian institutions promote favorable investment climates. Using data on oil nationalization in a sample of autocracies, this study finds that legislatures are correlated with lower expropriation risk in non-personalist dictatorships, but a higher risk of nationalization in personalist regimes. The results show a consistent pattern between authoritarian institutions and property protections, for which context matters.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1-17
Number of pages17
JournalBritish Journal of Political Science
Volume47
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2017

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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Sociology and Political Science

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