Bank runs: Deposit insurance and capital requirements

Russell Wade Cooper, Thomas W. Ross

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

37 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Diamond and Dybvig provide a model of intermediation in which deposit insurance can avoid socially undesirable bank runs. We extend the Diamond-Dybvig model to evaluate the costs and benefits of deposit insurance in the presence of moral hazard by banks and monitoring by depositors. We find that complete deposit insurance alone will not support the first-best outcome: depositors will not have adequate incentives for monitoring and banks will invest in excessively risky projects. However, an additional capital requirement for banks can restore the first-best allocation.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)55-72
Number of pages18
JournalInternational Economic Review
Volume43
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2002

Fingerprint

Capital requirements
Deposit insurance
Bank runs
Monitoring
Diamond
Moral hazard
Intermediation
Incentives
Costs and benefits
Diamond model

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

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Bank runs : Deposit insurance and capital requirements. / Cooper, Russell Wade; Ross, Thomas W.

In: International Economic Review, Vol. 43, No. 1, 01.01.2002, p. 55-72.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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