Bank runs: Liquidity costs and investment distortions

Russell Cooper, Thomas W. Ross

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

88 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this paper we extend the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model of intermediation to study further the conditions under which bank runs can occur and to consider how private parties might adjust to the existence of bank-run equilibria. We provide weaker necessary conditions for runs. We then characterize how banks respond to the possibility of runs in their design of deposit contracts and investment decisions. Banks might choose to offer contracts that prevent runs, but under some conditions the (second) best contracts will involve accepting some risk of runs in order to achieve higher expected returns from their investments.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)27-38
Number of pages12
JournalJournal of Monetary Economics
Volume41
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 1998

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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