Bargaining under two-sided incomplete information: the unrestricted offers case

Kalyan Chatterjee, Larry Samuelson

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

47 Scopus citations

Abstract

The authors recently examined a noncooperative game-theoretic bargaining model with two-sided incomplete information and an infinite horizon. This paper examines the model without restrictions. By doing so, we will gain some insight into whether these results are robust, in the sense that they do not depend upon the special structure of the model, and hence, might provide useful theoretical foundations for applied work. We find that the basic results generalize. As with the restricted model, we find an equilibrium in which bargaining will proceed for a finite but endogeneously determined number of stages. A terminal condition on the equilibrium sequence of agents' beliefs determines the properties of the equilibrium and allows comparative static results to be obtained.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)605-618
Number of pages14
JournalOperations Research
Volume36
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 1988

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Science Applications
  • Management Science and Operations Research

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Bargaining under two-sided incomplete information: the unrestricted offers case'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this