Bargaining under two-sided incomplete information: the unrestricted offers case

Kalyan Chatterjee, Larry Samuelson

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

47 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The authors recently examined a noncooperative game-theoretic bargaining model with two-sided incomplete information and an infinite horizon. This paper examines the model without restrictions. By doing so, we will gain some insight into whether these results are robust, in the sense that they do not depend upon the special structure of the model, and hence, might provide useful theoretical foundations for applied work. We find that the basic results generalize. As with the restricted model, we find an equilibrium in which bargaining will proceed for a finite but endogeneously determined number of stages. A terminal condition on the equilibrium sequence of agents' beliefs determines the properties of the equilibrium and allows comparative static results to be obtained.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)605-618
Number of pages14
JournalOperations Research
Volume36
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 1988

Fingerprint

Incomplete information
Bargaining model
Non-cooperative game
Comparative statics
Infinite horizon

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Science Applications
  • Management Science and Operations Research

Cite this

@article{9eb679c5471e47828f50cb04fed88a79,
title = "Bargaining under two-sided incomplete information: the unrestricted offers case",
abstract = "The authors recently examined a noncooperative game-theoretic bargaining model with two-sided incomplete information and an infinite horizon. This paper examines the model without restrictions. By doing so, we will gain some insight into whether these results are robust, in the sense that they do not depend upon the special structure of the model, and hence, might provide useful theoretical foundations for applied work. We find that the basic results generalize. As with the restricted model, we find an equilibrium in which bargaining will proceed for a finite but endogeneously determined number of stages. A terminal condition on the equilibrium sequence of agents' beliefs determines the properties of the equilibrium and allows comparative static results to be obtained.",
author = "Kalyan Chatterjee and Larry Samuelson",
year = "1988",
month = "1",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1287/opre.36.4.605",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "36",
pages = "605--618",
journal = "Operations Research",
issn = "0030-364X",
publisher = "INFORMS Inst.for Operations Res.and the Management Sciences",
number = "4",

}

Bargaining under two-sided incomplete information : the unrestricted offers case. / Chatterjee, Kalyan; Samuelson, Larry.

In: Operations Research, Vol. 36, No. 4, 01.01.1988, p. 605-618.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

TY - JOUR

T1 - Bargaining under two-sided incomplete information

T2 - the unrestricted offers case

AU - Chatterjee, Kalyan

AU - Samuelson, Larry

PY - 1988/1/1

Y1 - 1988/1/1

N2 - The authors recently examined a noncooperative game-theoretic bargaining model with two-sided incomplete information and an infinite horizon. This paper examines the model without restrictions. By doing so, we will gain some insight into whether these results are robust, in the sense that they do not depend upon the special structure of the model, and hence, might provide useful theoretical foundations for applied work. We find that the basic results generalize. As with the restricted model, we find an equilibrium in which bargaining will proceed for a finite but endogeneously determined number of stages. A terminal condition on the equilibrium sequence of agents' beliefs determines the properties of the equilibrium and allows comparative static results to be obtained.

AB - The authors recently examined a noncooperative game-theoretic bargaining model with two-sided incomplete information and an infinite horizon. This paper examines the model without restrictions. By doing so, we will gain some insight into whether these results are robust, in the sense that they do not depend upon the special structure of the model, and hence, might provide useful theoretical foundations for applied work. We find that the basic results generalize. As with the restricted model, we find an equilibrium in which bargaining will proceed for a finite but endogeneously determined number of stages. A terminal condition on the equilibrium sequence of agents' beliefs determines the properties of the equilibrium and allows comparative static results to be obtained.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0024036066&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0024036066&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1287/opre.36.4.605

DO - 10.1287/opre.36.4.605

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:0024036066

VL - 36

SP - 605

EP - 618

JO - Operations Research

JF - Operations Research

SN - 0030-364X

IS - 4

ER -