Bargaining with surplus destruction

Lutz Alexander Busch, Shouyong Shi, Quan Wen

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

16 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In a two-player alternating-offer bargaining model, if one player can destroy the surplus to be allocated, then the value to bargain for is endogenous, except at the beginning. Even with complete information, the model has perfect equilibria with delayed agreement and/or surplus destruction. The model therefore explains inefficiency and destruction that may appear irrational. We characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs and its limiting behaviour as the time between offers vanishes. Real time delay remains possible even in the limit. We also consider the case of surplus destruction that is exogenously limited by the time between offers. JEL Classification: C73, C78.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)915-932
Number of pages18
JournalCanadian Journal of Economics
Volume31
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 1998

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Surplus
Alternating offers
Complete information
Perfect equilibrium
Bargaining model
Time delay
JEL classification
Inefficiency

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Busch, Lutz Alexander ; Shi, Shouyong ; Wen, Quan. / Bargaining with surplus destruction. In: Canadian Journal of Economics. 1998 ; Vol. 31, No. 4. pp. 915-932.
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Bargaining with surplus destruction. / Busch, Lutz Alexander; Shi, Shouyong; Wen, Quan.

In: Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 31, No. 4, 01.01.1998, p. 915-932.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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