Bayesian Learning in Repeated Games

James Schuyler Jordan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

34 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper studies repeated games with a finite number of players, a finite number of actions, discounted payoffs, and perfect recall. The players′ initial expectations are given by a common prior distribution over player types, a type being a discount rate and payoff matrix. The main result is that Bayesian Nash equilibria have the property that, with probability one, players′ expectations asymptotically approach the set of Nash equilibria for the repeated game specified by the true types. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)8-20
Number of pages13
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume9
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 1995

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Repeated games
Bayesian learning
Economics
Discount rate
Nash equilibrium
Common priors
Bayesian Nash equilibrium

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Jordan, James Schuyler. / Bayesian Learning in Repeated Games. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 1995 ; Vol. 9, No. 1. pp. 8-20.
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Bayesian Learning in Repeated Games. / Jordan, James Schuyler.

In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 9, No. 1, 01.01.1995, p. 8-20.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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