Abstract
While the threat of bioterrorism carries with it strong emotions of fear and panic, the likelihood-adjusted fatality rates for a horrific bioterror event pale in comparison to that of an infectious disease like influenza. Based on this assumed risk of occurrence, the likelihood-adjusted fatality rate of a bioweapon attack is 900 deaths per year as compared to 36,000 deaths per year for influenza. The FY2016 budget for biodefense was $1.4 million in comparison to $1.2 million for pandemic influenza and emerging diseases. In addition to poor allocation of funds based on actual risk, the biodefense budget lacks government oversight, has poorly defined objectives and unnecessary redundancy. Streamlining the budget and appropriating funds with more emphasis on actual risk would allow an increase in essential areas of public health.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 295-300 |
| Number of pages | 6 |
| Journal | Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management |
| Volume | 13 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Sep 1 2016 |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Business, Management and Accounting (miscellaneous)
- Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality
- Safety Research
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Biodefense Spending and Waste : Impact on Public Health Initiatives. / Kelly, Erin Lynne; Zola, Adam; Strzalkowski, Monica; MacMillan, Benjamin; MacGreggor-Skinner, Gavin.
In: Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, Vol. 13, No. 3, 01.09.2016, p. 295-300.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
TY - JOUR
T1 - Biodefense Spending and Waste
T2 - Impact on Public Health Initiatives
AU - Kelly, Erin Lynne
AU - Zola, Adam
AU - Strzalkowski, Monica
AU - MacMillan, Benjamin
AU - MacGreggor-Skinner, Gavin
PY - 2016/9/1
Y1 - 2016/9/1
N2 - While the threat of bioterrorism carries with it strong emotions of fear and panic, the likelihood-adjusted fatality rates for a horrific bioterror event pale in comparison to that of an infectious disease like influenza. Based on this assumed risk of occurrence, the likelihood-adjusted fatality rate of a bioweapon attack is 900 deaths per year as compared to 36,000 deaths per year for influenza. The FY2016 budget for biodefense was $1.4 million in comparison to $1.2 million for pandemic influenza and emerging diseases. In addition to poor allocation of funds based on actual risk, the biodefense budget lacks government oversight, has poorly defined objectives and unnecessary redundancy. Streamlining the budget and appropriating funds with more emphasis on actual risk would allow an increase in essential areas of public health.
AB - While the threat of bioterrorism carries with it strong emotions of fear and panic, the likelihood-adjusted fatality rates for a horrific bioterror event pale in comparison to that of an infectious disease like influenza. Based on this assumed risk of occurrence, the likelihood-adjusted fatality rate of a bioweapon attack is 900 deaths per year as compared to 36,000 deaths per year for influenza. The FY2016 budget for biodefense was $1.4 million in comparison to $1.2 million for pandemic influenza and emerging diseases. In addition to poor allocation of funds based on actual risk, the biodefense budget lacks government oversight, has poorly defined objectives and unnecessary redundancy. Streamlining the budget and appropriating funds with more emphasis on actual risk would allow an increase in essential areas of public health.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84997354268&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84997354268&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1515/jhsem-2016-0029
DO - 10.1515/jhsem-2016-0029
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84997354268
VL - 13
SP - 295
EP - 300
JO - Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management
JF - Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management
SN - 1547-7355
IS - 3
ER -