Breaking the winner's curse in outsourcing

Bin Jiang, Srinivas Talluri, Tao Yao, Yongma Moon

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

6 Scopus citations

Abstract

This research utilizes real options theory to investigate how to break the winner's curse in contracting through effective contracting mechanisms. We focus on two contracting approaches: flexible price contract and gain-sharing contract. For reasons of analytical tractability, we first utilize the geometric Brownian motion as the dynamic model to obtain closed-form solutions to break the outsourcing winner's curse. Subsequently, we extend our model to the mean-reverting process and provide numerical examples to verify the validity of our closed-form results, which have not previously been presented in the outsourcing literature. Finally, we provide prescriptions for the problem of the winner's curse in outsourcing.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)573-594
Number of pages22
JournalDecision Sciences
Volume41
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 1 2010

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
  • Strategy and Management
  • Information Systems and Management
  • Management of Technology and Innovation

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