Can shareholder advocacy shape energy governance? The case of the US antifracking movement

Kate J. Neville, Jackie Cook, Jennifer E. Baka, Karen Bakker, Erika S. Weinthal

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Research on socially responsible investing (SRI) and investor-led governance, especially in the climate sector, suggests that shareholders adopt social movement tactics to influence corporate governance, including building networks, engaging directly with corporations and lobbying regulators. Further, research on corporate transparency and financial disclosure has proliferated, notably in the extractives sector. Our work builds on these existing literatures, with a focus on shareholder resolutions on hydraulic fracturing (HF) in the United States. We analyze US HF-focused shareholder resolutions from 2010 to 2016 to evaluate filing strategies and outcomes. We argue that these resolutions provide space for a range of new actors to shape corporate governance—but their power is constrained. The constraints flow from the same political economy factors that enable shareholders to take collective action: the distance between individual investors and financial decisions; the structure of resolutions and managerial responses; and the complexity of investment vehicles and vote shares. We assess how shareholders respond strategically by altering the focus of resolution demands, liaising with external campaigns and networks, and engaging with government to enhance regulatory interventions. Our work reveals how the upstreaming of power in commodity chains intersects with the power of management boards and the challenges of financialization, with consequences for corporate and energy governance.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)104-133
Number of pages30
JournalReview of International Political Economy
Volume26
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 2 2019

Fingerprint

shareholder
governance
energy
investor
corporate governance
social movement
collective behavior
tactics
transparency
commodity
political economy
corporation
voter
campaign
Advocacy
Energy
Governance
Shareholders
climate
management

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Political Science and International Relations

Cite this

Neville, Kate J. ; Cook, Jackie ; Baka, Jennifer E. ; Bakker, Karen ; Weinthal, Erika S. / Can shareholder advocacy shape energy governance? The case of the US antifracking movement. In: Review of International Political Economy. 2019 ; Vol. 26, No. 1. pp. 104-133.
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Can shareholder advocacy shape energy governance? The case of the US antifracking movement. / Neville, Kate J.; Cook, Jackie; Baka, Jennifer E.; Bakker, Karen; Weinthal, Erika S.

In: Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 26, No. 1, 02.01.2019, p. 104-133.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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