TY - JOUR
T1 - Chief Executive Officer Regulatory Focus and Competitive Action Frequency
AU - Agnihotri, Arpita
AU - Bhattacharya, Saurabh
N1 - Funding Information:
We are very thankful to Dr. Rau and the two anonymous reviewers, whose excellent comments and guidance tremendously helped us improve the paper. The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This research was supported by internal grants of Newcastle University Business School.
Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s) 2021.
PY - 2021/10
Y1 - 2021/10
N2 - Using regulatory focus, the Chief Executive Officer-Top Management Team (CEO-TMT) interface, and upper echelons theories, the present study casts additional light on the competitive action frequency of firms, as determined by their chief executive officers (CEOs) regulatory focus under the contingent effect of the CEO–TMT dissimilarity of informational demographics. Applying regulatory focus and upper echelons theories, this study first hypothesizes how CEO regulatory focus influences competitive action frequency. Next, leveraging CEO–TMT interface research, this study suggests moderating effects on the part of CEO–TMT dissimilarity, across functional background and tenure, and on the relationship between CEO regulatory focus and competitive action frequency. Drawing on a sample of 218 firms from India for a 5-year period (2010–2015), we find that a CEO promotion focus enhances a firm’s competitive action frequency and that a prevention focus diminishes the same. Furthermore, dissimilarities in terms of both CEO–TMT functional background orientation and tenure in the organization moderate this relationship. This study concludes with a discussion of the article’s theoretical and practical implications.
AB - Using regulatory focus, the Chief Executive Officer-Top Management Team (CEO-TMT) interface, and upper echelons theories, the present study casts additional light on the competitive action frequency of firms, as determined by their chief executive officers (CEOs) regulatory focus under the contingent effect of the CEO–TMT dissimilarity of informational demographics. Applying regulatory focus and upper echelons theories, this study first hypothesizes how CEO regulatory focus influences competitive action frequency. Next, leveraging CEO–TMT interface research, this study suggests moderating effects on the part of CEO–TMT dissimilarity, across functional background and tenure, and on the relationship between CEO regulatory focus and competitive action frequency. Drawing on a sample of 218 firms from India for a 5-year period (2010–2015), we find that a CEO promotion focus enhances a firm’s competitive action frequency and that a prevention focus diminishes the same. Furthermore, dissimilarities in terms of both CEO–TMT functional background orientation and tenure in the organization moderate this relationship. This study concludes with a discussion of the article’s theoretical and practical implications.
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U2 - 10.1177/1059601120981411
DO - 10.1177/1059601120981411
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85097831699
VL - 46
SP - 931
EP - 962
JO - Group and Organization Management
JF - Group and Organization Management
SN - 1059-6011
IS - 5
ER -