Collusion and equilibrium selection in auctions

Anthony M. Kwasnica, Katerina Sherstyuk

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

34 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study bidder collusion and test the power of payoff dominance as an equilibrium selection principle in experimental multi-object ascending auctions. In these institutions low-price collusive equilibria exist along with competitive payoff-inferior equilibria. Achieving payoff-superior collusive outcomes requires complex strategies that, depending on the environment, may involve signalling, market splitting, and bid rotation. We provide the first systematic evidence of successful bidder collusion in such complex environments without communication. The results demonstrate that in repeated settings bidders are often able to coordinate on payoff-superior outcomes, with the choice of collusive strategies varying systematically with the environment.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)120-145
Number of pages26
JournalEconomic Journal
Volume117
Issue number516
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2007

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Collusion
Equilibrium selection
Auctions
Bid
Communication
Ascending auctions
Payoff dominance
Equilibrium price

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Kwasnica, Anthony M. ; Sherstyuk, Katerina. / Collusion and equilibrium selection in auctions. In: Economic Journal. 2007 ; Vol. 117, No. 516. pp. 120-145.
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Collusion and equilibrium selection in auctions. / Kwasnica, Anthony M.; Sherstyuk, Katerina.

In: Economic Journal, Vol. 117, No. 516, 01.01.2007, p. 120-145.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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