Communication in bargaining games with unanimity

Marina Agranov, Chloe Jeanne Tergiman

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Communication has been shown to increase proposer power in multilateral bargaining settings that use majority voting rule via competition between non-proposers for a place in the coalition. In this paper we investigate whether communication affects bargaining outcomes and the bargaining process in settings in which the competition effect is not present. We study committees that use unanimity rule to pass allocations. We find that in these settings, communication has the complete opposite effect compared with the majority settings: under unanimity, communication eliminates the inefficiencies that are present in settings without communication and it shifts bargaining outcomes towards egalitarian allocations with no proposer power. Communication logs provide insights regarding the topics subjects discuss and communication content correlates with bargaining outcomes.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)350-368
Number of pages19
JournalExperimental Economics
Volume22
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 15 2019

Fingerprint

Unanimity
Communication
Bargaining games
Voting rules
Majority voting
Correlates
Multilateral bargaining
Inefficiency

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)

Cite this

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Communication in bargaining games with unanimity. / Agranov, Marina; Tergiman, Chloe Jeanne.

In: Experimental Economics, Vol. 22, No. 2, 15.06.2019, p. 350-368.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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