This paper develops a series of models under different assumptions with regard to (i) the information available to the arbiter about the preferences of the parties, (ii) the information available to the parties about the preferences of the arbiter and (iii) the specific approach adopted by the arbiter to resolve the issue, in order to throw some light on the effect of the arbitration recourse on bargaining. The approach followed is Bayesian and is similar to that used in the recent bargaining models developed at Harvard.
|Original language||English (US)|
|Number of pages||6|
|Journal||Proceedings - International Conference on Cybernetics and Society|
|State||Published - Jan 1 1980|
|Event||Proc Int Conf Cybern Soc - Cambridge, MA, Engl|
Duration: Oct 8 1980 → Oct 10 1980
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes