Confusion or fairness in the field? Rejections in the ultimatum game under the strategy method

Donna L. Bahry, Rick K. Wilson

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

51 Scopus citations

Abstract

Field experiments conducted in two multi-ethnic republics of Russia show that responders employ varied strategies in an "ultimatum game". While many responders choose strategies that are monotonically rational and characteristic of most ultimatum game results (rejecting low offers and accepting high ones), almost as many others display a tendency towards "hyper-fairness" (rejecting offers that are too low and too high). Proposers, in turn, seem to take this into account with an unusually high proportion of 50/50 splits. Drawing on data from the experiments and a related survey, this paper focuses on the variation in responders' strategies, and the factors that account for the differences.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)37-54
Number of pages18
JournalJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Volume60
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - May 1 2006

    Fingerprint

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

Cite this