Abstract
Historians of the U.S. Congress often draw claims from interpretations of legislators' rhetoric and the outcomes of key votes. In this article, the author tells a cautionary tale: Such strategies ignore the correspondence between roll-call voting on select issues and broader coalitional structures in Congress. He does so by examining contrary positions about a key issue during the New Deal: On the one hand, some researchers claim that reasoned congressional deliberation on the issue of administrative oversight was separate from the prevailing legislative concerns of the day. Other scholars, on the other hand, assert that the prevailing issue dimensions in Congress included administrative oversight. Using a Bayesian measurement method, Ordinary Least Squares, and probit regression, and a novel selection of roll-call data, the author tested these claims, concluding that broader coalitional structures subsumed issues of administration.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 125-137 |
| Number of pages | 13 |
| Journal | Historical Methods |
| Volume | 43 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jul 1 2010 |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- History
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Congressional ideology and administrative oversight in the New Deal era. / Bertelli, Anthony.
In: Historical Methods, Vol. 43, No. 3, 01.07.2010, p. 125-137.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
TY - JOUR
T1 - Congressional ideology and administrative oversight in the New Deal era
AU - Bertelli, Anthony
PY - 2010/7/1
Y1 - 2010/7/1
N2 - Historians of the U.S. Congress often draw claims from interpretations of legislators' rhetoric and the outcomes of key votes. In this article, the author tells a cautionary tale: Such strategies ignore the correspondence between roll-call voting on select issues and broader coalitional structures in Congress. He does so by examining contrary positions about a key issue during the New Deal: On the one hand, some researchers claim that reasoned congressional deliberation on the issue of administrative oversight was separate from the prevailing legislative concerns of the day. Other scholars, on the other hand, assert that the prevailing issue dimensions in Congress included administrative oversight. Using a Bayesian measurement method, Ordinary Least Squares, and probit regression, and a novel selection of roll-call data, the author tested these claims, concluding that broader coalitional structures subsumed issues of administration.
AB - Historians of the U.S. Congress often draw claims from interpretations of legislators' rhetoric and the outcomes of key votes. In this article, the author tells a cautionary tale: Such strategies ignore the correspondence between roll-call voting on select issues and broader coalitional structures in Congress. He does so by examining contrary positions about a key issue during the New Deal: On the one hand, some researchers claim that reasoned congressional deliberation on the issue of administrative oversight was separate from the prevailing legislative concerns of the day. Other scholars, on the other hand, assert that the prevailing issue dimensions in Congress included administrative oversight. Using a Bayesian measurement method, Ordinary Least Squares, and probit regression, and a novel selection of roll-call data, the author tested these claims, concluding that broader coalitional structures subsumed issues of administration.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=77955193266&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=77955193266&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1080/01615441003667491
DO - 10.1080/01615441003667491
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:77955193266
VL - 43
SP - 125
EP - 137
JO - Historical Methods
JF - Historical Methods
SN - 0161-5440
IS - 3
ER -