Abstract
In oligopolistic situations, content protection can have unexpected effects as it changes the nature of interactions between input suppliers. With a duopoly, it does so in a manner that makes the foreign firm wish to match price increases and decreases of the domestic firm. Domestic input suppliers can therefore lose from such policies, even when set at free trade levels. The relation between input demands, the form of protection, and the degree of substitution between inputs is shown to define the effects of content protection tnd to provide the basis for understanding who might lobby for protection in different environments.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 108-125 |
| Number of pages | 18 |
| Journal | Review of Economic Studies |
| Volume | 55 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jan 1988 |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Economics and Econometrics
Cite this
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Content protection and oligopolistic interactions. / Krishna, Kala; Itoh, Motoshige.
In: Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 55, No. 1, 01.1988, p. 108-125.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
TY - JOUR
T1 - Content protection and oligopolistic interactions
AU - Krishna, Kala
AU - Itoh, Motoshige
PY - 1988/1
Y1 - 1988/1
N2 - In oligopolistic situations, content protection can have unexpected effects as it changes the nature of interactions between input suppliers. With a duopoly, it does so in a manner that makes the foreign firm wish to match price increases and decreases of the domestic firm. Domestic input suppliers can therefore lose from such policies, even when set at free trade levels. The relation between input demands, the form of protection, and the degree of substitution between inputs is shown to define the effects of content protection tnd to provide the basis for understanding who might lobby for protection in different environments.
AB - In oligopolistic situations, content protection can have unexpected effects as it changes the nature of interactions between input suppliers. With a duopoly, it does so in a manner that makes the foreign firm wish to match price increases and decreases of the domestic firm. Domestic input suppliers can therefore lose from such policies, even when set at free trade levels. The relation between input demands, the form of protection, and the degree of substitution between inputs is shown to define the effects of content protection tnd to provide the basis for understanding who might lobby for protection in different environments.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84928516195&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84928516195&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.2307/2297532
DO - 10.2307/2297532
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84928516195
VL - 55
SP - 108
EP - 125
JO - Review of Economic Studies
JF - Review of Economic Studies
SN - 0034-6527
IS - 1
ER -