Contests with productive effort

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

8 Scopus citations

Abstract

I consider competitions in which, conditional on winning or losing, the effort exerted by a competitor does not necessarily decrease his payoff. This happens, for example, in competitions for promotions in which workers are intrinsically motivated, and in research and development races in which better performance implies a higher payoff from winning. I characterize players' equilibrium payoffs in closed form, thereby generalizing Siegel (Econometrica 77(1):71-92, 2009) payoff result to contests in which players' payoff functions are non-monotonic.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)515-523
Number of pages9
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume43
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2014

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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