Cooperative jamming via spectrum leasing

Igor Stanojev, Aylin Yener

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    10 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Secure communication rates can be facilitated or enhanced via deployment of cooperative jammers in a multi-terminal environment. Such an approach typically assumes dedicated and/or altruistic jamming nodes, investing their resources for the good of the whole system. In this paper, we demonstrate that jammers can be recruited to provide significant improvements of secrecy rates even when this assumption is alleviated. A game-theoretic framework is proposed where a source node, towards the maximization of its secrecy rate, utilizes the jamming services from a set of non-altruistic nodes, compensating them with a fraction of its bandwidth for transmission of their user data. With the goal of maximizing their user-data transmission rate priced by the invested power, potential cooperative jammers will provide the jamming/transmitting power that is generally proportional to the amount of leased bandwidth. Elaborating initially on a single-jammer scenario, interaction between the source and a cooperative jammer is modeled as the Stackelberg leader-follower game. The scheme is further extended to involve multiple potential jammers, applying competition mechanisms such as the auctioning and power control game, while maintaining the Stackelberg framework.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Title of host publication2011 International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization of Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2011
    Pages265-272
    Number of pages8
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jul 26 2011
    Event2011 International Symposium of on Modeling and Optimization of Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2011 - Princeton, NJ, United States
    Duration: May 9 2011May 13 2011

    Publication series

    Name2011 International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization of Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2011

    Other

    Other2011 International Symposium of on Modeling and Optimization of Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2011
    CountryUnited States
    CityPrinceton, NJ
    Period5/9/115/13/11

    Fingerprint

    Atmospheric spectra
    leasing
    Jamming
    secrecy
    Bandwidth
    follower
    Power control
    Data communication systems
    leader
    scenario
    communication
    interaction
    resources

    All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

    • Computer Networks and Communications
    • Communication

    Cite this

    Stanojev, I., & Yener, A. (2011). Cooperative jamming via spectrum leasing. In 2011 International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization of Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2011 (pp. 265-272). [5930026] (2011 International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization of Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2011). https://doi.org/10.1109/WIOPT.2011.5930026
    Stanojev, Igor ; Yener, Aylin. / Cooperative jamming via spectrum leasing. 2011 International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization of Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2011. 2011. pp. 265-272 (2011 International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization of Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2011).
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    abstract = "Secure communication rates can be facilitated or enhanced via deployment of cooperative jammers in a multi-terminal environment. Such an approach typically assumes dedicated and/or altruistic jamming nodes, investing their resources for the good of the whole system. In this paper, we demonstrate that jammers can be recruited to provide significant improvements of secrecy rates even when this assumption is alleviated. A game-theoretic framework is proposed where a source node, towards the maximization of its secrecy rate, utilizes the jamming services from a set of non-altruistic nodes, compensating them with a fraction of its bandwidth for transmission of their user data. With the goal of maximizing their user-data transmission rate priced by the invested power, potential cooperative jammers will provide the jamming/transmitting power that is generally proportional to the amount of leased bandwidth. Elaborating initially on a single-jammer scenario, interaction between the source and a cooperative jammer is modeled as the Stackelberg leader-follower game. The scheme is further extended to involve multiple potential jammers, applying competition mechanisms such as the auctioning and power control game, while maintaining the Stackelberg framework.",
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    Stanojev, I & Yener, A 2011, Cooperative jamming via spectrum leasing. in 2011 International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization of Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2011., 5930026, 2011 International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization of Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2011, pp. 265-272, 2011 International Symposium of on Modeling and Optimization of Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2011, Princeton, NJ, United States, 5/9/11. https://doi.org/10.1109/WIOPT.2011.5930026

    Cooperative jamming via spectrum leasing. / Stanojev, Igor; Yener, Aylin.

    2011 International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization of Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2011. 2011. p. 265-272 5930026 (2011 International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization of Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2011).

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

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    Stanojev I, Yener A. Cooperative jamming via spectrum leasing. In 2011 International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization of Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2011. 2011. p. 265-272. 5930026. (2011 International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization of Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2011). https://doi.org/10.1109/WIOPT.2011.5930026