Abstract
Recent research has highlighted the quantitative contribution to merger analysis from extending unilateral effects models to understand the payoffs to future potential coordinated effects. Some of the emphasis of this research appears to have made its way into the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines. In this paper, we demonstrate the quantification of coordinated effects in an oligopoly and procurement model, and we show that screens that are based on upward pricing pressure are not adequate in mergers where coordinated effects are a potential concern.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 39-56 |
Number of pages | 18 |
Journal | Review of Industrial Organization |
Volume | 39 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Aug 2011 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Economics and Econometrics
- Strategy and Management
- Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
- Management of Technology and Innovation