Coordination, matching, and wages

Melanie Cao, Shouyong Shi

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

18 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We analyse the coordination problem in the labour market by endogenizing the matching function and the wage share. Each firm posts a wage to maximize the expected profit, anticipating how the wage affects the expected number of applicants. In equilibrium workers apply to firms with mixed strategies, which generate coordination failure and persistent unemployment. We show how the wage share, unemployment, and the welfare loss from the coordination failure depend on the market tightness and the market size. The welfare loss from the coordination failure is as high as 7.5 per cent of potential output.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1009-1033
Number of pages25
JournalCanadian Journal of Economics
Volume33
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2000

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Wages
Coordination failure
Welfare loss
Unemployment
Labour market
Matching function
Mixed strategy
Market size
Coordination problems
Profit
Workers
Potential output

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Cao, Melanie ; Shi, Shouyong. / Coordination, matching, and wages. In: Canadian Journal of Economics. 2000 ; Vol. 33, No. 4. pp. 1009-1033.
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Coordination, matching, and wages. / Cao, Melanie; Shi, Shouyong.

In: Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 33, No. 4, 01.01.2000, p. 1009-1033.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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