Corporate governance and lobbying strategies

Ike Mathur, Manohar Singh, Fred Thompson, Ali Nejadmalayeri

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

36 Scopus citations


The paper extends the recent research on corporate non-market actions (Fernández & Usero, 2010, and Usero & Fernández, 2009). Specifically, we study whether corporate governance, in terms of managerial entrenchment, determines the choice and degree of lobbying engagements as a non-market strategy and with what impact on firm value. The results indicate that firms with more entrenched management have a greater tendency to engage in lobbying activities. Within the group of firms that lobby, there is a negative relation between the degree to which management is entrenched and lobbying intensity. In addition, there is a positive relation between lobbying intensity and value added by lobbying firms. Overall, the evidence suggests that corporate lobbying is not agency driven and may, in fact, create value.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)547-553
Number of pages7
JournalJournal of Business Research
Issue number4
StatePublished - Apr 1 2013

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Marketing


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