Abstract
The paper extends the recent research on corporate non-market actions (Fernández & Usero, 2010, and Usero & Fernández, 2009). Specifically, we study whether corporate governance, in terms of managerial entrenchment, determines the choice and degree of lobbying engagements as a non-market strategy and with what impact on firm value. The results indicate that firms with more entrenched management have a greater tendency to engage in lobbying activities. Within the group of firms that lobby, there is a negative relation between the degree to which management is entrenched and lobbying intensity. In addition, there is a positive relation between lobbying intensity and value added by lobbying firms. Overall, the evidence suggests that corporate lobbying is not agency driven and may, in fact, create value.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 547-553 |
| Number of pages | 7 |
| Journal | Journal of Business Research |
| Volume | 66 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Apr 1 2013 |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Marketing
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Corporate governance and lobbying strategies. / Mathur, Ike; Singh, Manohar; Thompson, Fred; Nejadmalayeri, Ali.
In: Journal of Business Research, Vol. 66, No. 4, 01.04.2013, p. 547-553.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
TY - JOUR
T1 - Corporate governance and lobbying strategies
AU - Mathur, Ike
AU - Singh, Manohar
AU - Thompson, Fred
AU - Nejadmalayeri, Ali
PY - 2013/4/1
Y1 - 2013/4/1
N2 - The paper extends the recent research on corporate non-market actions (Fernández & Usero, 2010, and Usero & Fernández, 2009). Specifically, we study whether corporate governance, in terms of managerial entrenchment, determines the choice and degree of lobbying engagements as a non-market strategy and with what impact on firm value. The results indicate that firms with more entrenched management have a greater tendency to engage in lobbying activities. Within the group of firms that lobby, there is a negative relation between the degree to which management is entrenched and lobbying intensity. In addition, there is a positive relation between lobbying intensity and value added by lobbying firms. Overall, the evidence suggests that corporate lobbying is not agency driven and may, in fact, create value.
AB - The paper extends the recent research on corporate non-market actions (Fernández & Usero, 2010, and Usero & Fernández, 2009). Specifically, we study whether corporate governance, in terms of managerial entrenchment, determines the choice and degree of lobbying engagements as a non-market strategy and with what impact on firm value. The results indicate that firms with more entrenched management have a greater tendency to engage in lobbying activities. Within the group of firms that lobby, there is a negative relation between the degree to which management is entrenched and lobbying intensity. In addition, there is a positive relation between lobbying intensity and value added by lobbying firms. Overall, the evidence suggests that corporate lobbying is not agency driven and may, in fact, create value.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84874343014&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84874343014&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jbusres.2012.01.003
DO - 10.1016/j.jbusres.2012.01.003
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84874343014
VL - 66
SP - 547
EP - 553
JO - Journal of Business Research
JF - Journal of Business Research
SN - 0148-2963
IS - 4
ER -