Corporate takeovers, firm performance, and board composition

Omesh Kini, William Kracaw, Shehzad Mian

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

97 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper examines the relation between corporate takeovers and the board of directors as alternative control mechanisms to discipline top management. Previous research shows that CEO turnover subsequent to corporate takeovers is inversely related to pre-takeover market-related performance. We find this relation is concentrated in targets with inside-dominated boards of directors. Our results support the notion that, as an alternative control device, takeovers serve as a "substitute" for outside directors. Further, we show that the discipline associated with corporate takeovers extends beyond top management to effect restructuring of the entire board. The nature of the discipline depends on the composition of the target board prior to the takeover. Disciplinary takeovers result in two general effects: (1) for inside-dominated targets, the number of inside directorships decreases while the number of outside directorships remains about the same; and (2) for outside-dominated boards, the number of inside directorships increases while the number of outside directorships decreases. As a result, the board is recomposed toward a more even balance between inside and outside directorships.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)383-412
Number of pages30
JournalJournal of Corporate Finance
Volume1
Issue number3-4
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 1995

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Board composition
Corporate takeovers
Firm performance
Top management
Board of directors
Control mechanism
Outside directors
Substitute
CEO turnover

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Business and International Management
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Strategy and Management

Cite this

Kini, Omesh ; Kracaw, William ; Mian, Shehzad. / Corporate takeovers, firm performance, and board composition. In: Journal of Corporate Finance. 1995 ; Vol. 1, No. 3-4. pp. 383-412.
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Corporate takeovers, firm performance, and board composition. / Kini, Omesh; Kracaw, William; Mian, Shehzad.

In: Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 1, No. 3-4, 01.01.1995, p. 383-412.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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