CREDIBILITY AND STRATEGIC LEARNING IN NETWORKS

Kalyan Chatterjee, Bhaskar Dutta

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

5 Scopus citations

Abstract

We analyze a model of diffusion in a fixed, finite connected network. There is an interested party that knows the quality of the product being propagated and chooses an implant in the network to influence other agents to buy. Agents are either “innovators,” who adopt immediately, or rational. Rational consumers buy if buying instead of waiting maximizes expected utility. We consider the conditions on the network under which optimal diffusion of the good product with probability 1 is a perfect Bayes equilibrium.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)759-786
Number of pages28
JournalInternational Economic Review
Volume57
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 1 2016

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

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