Cyber War and Deterrence Stability: Post-START Nuclear Arms Control

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Abstract

Nuclear deterrence and cyber war are often discussed as separate worlds of research and military-strategic practice. To the contrary, a certain degree of overlap between nuclear deterrence and cyber conflicts is a plausible expectation for several reasons. First, future deterrent challenges will include regional nuclear arms races accompanied by competition in information technology and other aspects of advanced conventional command-control and precision strike systems. Second, cyber-attacks may be used against opposed nuclear command-control systems and weapons platforms as well as against infrastructure for the purpose of mass disruption during a crisis or war. Third, cyber capabilities support escalation dominance or escalation control, depending on the objectives of states and on the transparency of identification for cyber friends and foes. © 2014

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)279-286
Number of pages8
JournalComparative Strategy
Volume33
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - May 2014

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Political Science and International Relations

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