Decentralizing Pork: Congressional Roll-Call Voting, Decentralized Administration, and Distributive Politics

Anthony Bertelli, Pamela J.Clouser McCann

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Congress packages pork-barrel spending in complicated proposals that belie theories of distributive politics. We theorize that roll-call voting on such bills depends on grant programs' administrative centralization, party ties with presidents or home-state governors, and differences in geographic representation between chambers. Analyzing votes between 1973 and 2010 using a within-legislator strategy reveals that House members are less likely to support decentralized spending when they are copartisans with presidents, while senators support decentralization regardless of such party ties. When House members or senators share affiliation with only governors or with neither chief executive, the likelihood of support rises with decentralization.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)69-100
Number of pages32
JournalLegislative Studies Quarterly
Volume43
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 1 2018

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decentralization
voting
president
politics
centralization
chamber
bill
grant
voter

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Sociology and Political Science

Cite this

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Decentralizing Pork : Congressional Roll-Call Voting, Decentralized Administration, and Distributive Politics. / Bertelli, Anthony; McCann, Pamela J.Clouser.

In: Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 43, No. 1, 01.02.2018, p. 69-100.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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