Democratic Accountability and the Politics of Mass Administrative Reorganization

Anthony Bertelli, J. Andrew Sinclair

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Governments face different incentives when they reorganize many administrative agencies at one time rather than making infrequent, case-by-case changes. This article develops a theory of mass administrative reorganizations, which posits that the politics of reorganization is focused on government accountability. Viewing mass reorganization as a structured decision, it argues that choices about independence, agency organization and functional disposition have different impacts on the political costs of administrative policy making. Analyzing novel data from a recent British reorganization with sequential logistic statistical models provides substantial support for these claims. The study challenges the focus on organizational survival in the existing literature. By eschewing more fundamental political questions of democratic accountability, the prevailing approach masks essential politics, and in the context of this study, all influence of conflict due to party and agency policy positions.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)691-711
Number of pages21
JournalBritish Journal of Political Science
Volume48
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 1 2018

Fingerprint

reorganization
responsibility
politics
administrative policy
disposition
logistics
incentive
organization
costs

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Sociology and Political Science

Cite this

@article{24605940ac34415e879a8f097b33e2ac,
title = "Democratic Accountability and the Politics of Mass Administrative Reorganization",
abstract = "Governments face different incentives when they reorganize many administrative agencies at one time rather than making infrequent, case-by-case changes. This article develops a theory of mass administrative reorganizations, which posits that the politics of reorganization is focused on government accountability. Viewing mass reorganization as a structured decision, it argues that choices about independence, agency organization and functional disposition have different impacts on the political costs of administrative policy making. Analyzing novel data from a recent British reorganization with sequential logistic statistical models provides substantial support for these claims. The study challenges the focus on organizational survival in the existing literature. By eschewing more fundamental political questions of democratic accountability, the prevailing approach masks essential politics, and in the context of this study, all influence of conflict due to party and agency policy positions.",
author = "Anthony Bertelli and Sinclair, {J. Andrew}",
year = "2018",
month = "7",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1017/S0007123416000077",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "48",
pages = "691--711",
journal = "British Journal of Political Science",
issn = "0007-1234",
publisher = "Cambridge University Press",
number = "3",

}

Democratic Accountability and the Politics of Mass Administrative Reorganization. / Bertelli, Anthony; Sinclair, J. Andrew.

In: British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 48, No. 3, 01.07.2018, p. 691-711.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

TY - JOUR

T1 - Democratic Accountability and the Politics of Mass Administrative Reorganization

AU - Bertelli, Anthony

AU - Sinclair, J. Andrew

PY - 2018/7/1

Y1 - 2018/7/1

N2 - Governments face different incentives when they reorganize many administrative agencies at one time rather than making infrequent, case-by-case changes. This article develops a theory of mass administrative reorganizations, which posits that the politics of reorganization is focused on government accountability. Viewing mass reorganization as a structured decision, it argues that choices about independence, agency organization and functional disposition have different impacts on the political costs of administrative policy making. Analyzing novel data from a recent British reorganization with sequential logistic statistical models provides substantial support for these claims. The study challenges the focus on organizational survival in the existing literature. By eschewing more fundamental political questions of democratic accountability, the prevailing approach masks essential politics, and in the context of this study, all influence of conflict due to party and agency policy positions.

AB - Governments face different incentives when they reorganize many administrative agencies at one time rather than making infrequent, case-by-case changes. This article develops a theory of mass administrative reorganizations, which posits that the politics of reorganization is focused on government accountability. Viewing mass reorganization as a structured decision, it argues that choices about independence, agency organization and functional disposition have different impacts on the political costs of administrative policy making. Analyzing novel data from a recent British reorganization with sequential logistic statistical models provides substantial support for these claims. The study challenges the focus on organizational survival in the existing literature. By eschewing more fundamental political questions of democratic accountability, the prevailing approach masks essential politics, and in the context of this study, all influence of conflict due to party and agency policy positions.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84978477276&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84978477276&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1017/S0007123416000077

DO - 10.1017/S0007123416000077

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84978477276

VL - 48

SP - 691

EP - 711

JO - British Journal of Political Science

JF - British Journal of Political Science

SN - 0007-1234

IS - 3

ER -