Deposit insurance and bank liquidation without commitment: Can we sleep well?

Russell Wade Cooper, Hubert Kempf

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper assesses the effects of the orderly liquidation of a failing bank and the ex post provision of deposit insurance on the prospect of bank runs. Assuming that the public institutions in charge of these policies lack commitment power, these interventions, both individually and jointly, are chosen and undertaken ex post. The costs of liquidation and redistribution across heterogeneous households play key roles in these decisions. If investment is sufficiently illiquid, a credible liquidation policy will deter runs. Despite the lack of commitment, deposit insurance, funded by an ex post tax scheme, will be provided unless it requires a (socially) undesirable redistribution of consumption that outweighs insurance gains. If taxes are set optimally ex post, runs are prevented by deposit insurance without costly liquidation. If not, a combination of the two policies will prevent runs.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)365-392
Number of pages28
JournalEconomic Theory
Volume61
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 1 2016

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Liquidation
Deposit insurance
Sleep
Tax
Redistribution
Public institutions
Costs
Charge
Bank runs
Household
Insurance

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

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Deposit insurance and bank liquidation without commitment : Can we sleep well? / Cooper, Russell Wade; Kempf, Hubert.

In: Economic Theory, Vol. 61, No. 2, 01.02.2016, p. 365-392.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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