Development of efficient combinatorial auction mechanism for airport slot allocation

Shankar Vinay Arul, Angappa Gunasekaran, S. P. Nachiappan, B. Ramasamy

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

The current allocation of slots in congested airports is fraught with deficiencies because of the liberalisation of air transportation undertaken all over the world. The existing grandfather rights rule is slowly being replaced with auctions. In the airport slot allocation problem, in order to effectively auction the slots, multiple-item auctions are employed. It is in this aspect that combinatorial auctions are employed, as they are the most efficacious in dealing with complimentarity. Since the existing mechanisms are more inclined towards maximising the auctioneer's profit - with the monetary issue being the only concern- they lead to biased allocations. Therefore, this paper develops a model and proposes a mechanism that could overcome the shortcomings of the existing auctioning procedures by incorporating the concepts of welfare issues with due consideration given to the flight capacity to effectively allot the slots.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)427-443
Number of pages17
JournalInternational Journal of Services and Operations Management
Volume3
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - 2007

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Management Science and Operations Research
  • Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
  • Management of Technology and Innovation

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