Did You See What i Saw? Interpreting Others' Forecasts When Their Information Is Unknown

Anthony Mark Kwasnica, Raisa Velthuis, Jared Williams

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We conduct a series of forecasting experiments to examine how people update their beliefs upon observing others' forecasts. Subjects exhibit "cursedness," that is, a propensity to underestimate the link between others' forecasts and others' information, which causes subjects to underreact. The behavior of sophisticated subjects is not affected by the framing of information, but unsophisticated subjects switch from underreaction to overreaction when they are only provided qualitative (rather than quantitative) forecast information. Our results have important implications for the way that financial analysts aggregate information and the way that financial institutions present forecasts to their clients.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)325-361
Number of pages37
JournalReview of Finance
Volume23
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 1 2019

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Overreaction
Financial analysts
Financial institutions
Underreaction
Propensity
Experiment

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

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Did You See What i Saw? Interpreting Others' Forecasts When Their Information Is Unknown. / Kwasnica, Anthony Mark; Velthuis, Raisa; Williams, Jared.

In: Review of Finance, Vol. 23, No. 2, 01.03.2019, p. 325-361.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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